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Anniversaries, being arbitrary markings on a calendar, fall randomly into
the lives of ongoing institutions. Consequently, we cannot expect that bicentennial reflections on the health of the presidency will necessarily produce
some special wisdom, the distilled product of a long two-hundred year view,
when there are a few more proximate scores still left to settle. At the end of
its first century the United States faced a similar problem, and somehow survived that celebration. In 1876 the President was elected under the most questionable circumstances ever. And on the two-hundredth birthday of independence, a President unelected in another sense sat in the White House.
Alert tuners-in to the news media are aware that behind this interesting
fact lies far juicier fare for the connoisseur of birthday blues. Indeed, Vietnam and Watergate have apparently accomplished what no amount of rational argument could have done: They have persuaded at least a few of the
noisier advocates of presidential government that the checks and balances the
founding fathers wrote into the Constitution may not have been such a bad
idea after all.' The question now arises whether in their newly-minted enthusiasm for curbing a rampant, villainous presidency these same observers
can be convinced that they must show common sense and moderation as well
as ingenuity. In short, now that they believe that the founding fathers did
well to put checks and balances into the Constitution can they be persuaded
that the checks and balances the founders put in are enough?
It is, of course, something of a fiction to believe that contemporary Americans can choose the sort of presidency they want, without reference to all that
has gone before. Yet, over the long haul, it is no doubt true that the presidency-as well as our other political institutions-does evolve in part out of
the climate of opinions, demands, and expectations that are created by
learned analysis.

I
RICHARD NIXON AND THE USES OF HISTORY

The presidency of Richard Nixon is currently the great storehouse of illustrations that students invoke in aid of arguments concerning the need to
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constrain the presidency in general, and future presidents in particular. This
is a part of the familiar procedure by which history becomes grist for the
contemporary mill. And yet, being such recent history, it is perhaps no wonder that a fully rounded historical understanding of the Nixon administration
is not yet a part of our common literature. Indeed, contemporary commentators are still at loggerheads over such questions as whether the Nixon administration was uniquely evil, or only best in show, or not materially different
from its predecessors.
What is at stake in settling questions of this kind is not only a matter of
psychological closure on recent historical events. Rather, answers form a basis
for recommendations about the future conduct of the constitutional order.
Hence they are likely to be far more passionately contested than squabbles of
merely scholarly import. Essentially, the radical position with respect to constitutional reform views the worst aspects of the Nixon administration as fundamentally continuous with the Johnson and Kennedy Presidencies, or at a
minimum fulfilling a potential clearly implied by the presidency in its modern, unconstrained imperial posture.2
Constitutional stand-patters, to the contrary, have a stake in the proposition that the Nixon administration was a once-in-a-blue-moon extravaganza of
usurpation and neglect of the common weal, the sovereign remedy for which
was the removal of Richard Nixon as President.
There is some merit to both arguments. Although Gerald Ford was an
even more conservative Republican than Richard Nixon, and up against a
liberal Democratic Congress, the complaints about the Ford Presidency fell far
short of noises about impeachment. So Nixon must have been doing at least a
few things differently from his successor, and these differences evidently did
not turn on partisan politics with respect to public policy. Indeed, not only
did the Democratic Congress accept Gerald Ford's enthusiastic partisanship in
everyday politics, it also accepted Ford's choice of a Republican for the vicepresidency, although it was well within their power to withhold confirmation.
In any case, none of the counts of the Nixon impeachment expressed simple partisan disagreement over policy. Yet they did allege acts of a sort that
subsequent investigation has disclosed were also indulged in by previous administrations. The conservative columnist Nick Thimmesch has prepared a
handy catalogue of transgressions, gathered mostly from the reports of the
3
Church committee investigation of intelligence activities:
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We learn, for example, that President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover to snoop on hundreds of Americans who had sent
FDR telegrams "all more or less in opposition to national defense" or that
approved Charles Lindbergh's criticism of Roosevelt. A few years later,
Hoover was sending "Personal and confidential" letters to President Truman
which contained tidbits of political intelligence-reports of Communist influence in a Senator's speech, advance word that a scandal was brewing which
would be "very embarrassing to the Democratic administration," and confidential reports on which publications were going to break stories exposing
organized crime and corrupt politicians. The Eisenhower Administration also
willingly received confidential advisories from the FBI on the role of Communists in the civil rights movement and derogatory raw files on individuals
charging the federal government with racial discrimination.
We learn that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson did not halt these questionable practices by the FBI, and actually were happy to make use of them.
Kennedy had the FBI pursue steel company executives and newsmen alike
during the steel crisis of 1962. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, despite
repeated denials, had allmanner of foes and suspects, including newsmen,

wiretapped. He is also finally revealed to be responsible for the wiretapping
and bugging of Martin Luther King, Jr. And no other President leaned on
the FBI to investigate citizens suspected of being his "enemies" as Lyndon
Johnson did. Members of Sen. Barry Goldwater's staff, a witness in the Bobby
Baker case, government bureaucrats, people attending the 1964 Democratic
convention, Mrs. Anna Chennault, Spiro Agnew, Vietnam war protesters-all
fell under federal surveillance because of Johnson's feelings of fear and vengeance.
These examples, arguably, provide continuity between the Nixon administration and its predecessors. What about differences? Thimmesch suggests
three: Congress in the hands of the opposite party, a "mood" of self-destruction in Washington, and presidential stupidity in such matters as tape-recording in the Oval Office.
It is possible to have a lively debate about the necessity and/or the sufficiency of any of these in producing an impeachable President. As to the fitst,
I flatly doubt that any sort of impeachment moves would have been politically
possible, or indeed undertaken, except on a bipartisan basis, and this condition was met. This sharply curtails the force of the argument that such things
are possible only when President and Congress are controlled by different
parties. As to the "mood" theory, there is nothing much to say. My impression
is that Washington is a moody town, and that a case can be made nearly all
the time that morale is low, that phantoms of various sizes and shapes are
stalking the landscape, and so on. Why no serious impeachment talk during
the waning days of the Truman administration? Or when Franklin D. Roosevelt made up his mind to go for a third term? No doubt some sort of antigovernment mood is a byproduct of impeachment, but as to its power to
cause impeachment, it seems unlikely.
The presidential stupidity theory has more to recommend it. For one
thing, it is infinitely expansible, encompassing whatever acts are historically
proximate to impeachment activity. Thus it seems likely to provide a ready
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explanation not only for Nixon-haters, but also for his defenders, such as, for
example, H. R. Haldeman, who can complain that Nixon was chiefly culpable in neglecting to make the "right moves." Thimmesch appears to adopt
that line of thought when he says "[i]f Richard Nixon is guilty of anything at
all, it is that he threw away the overwhelming support given him by the
American people in 1972."

4

My view is that this is a serious misstatement, all the more serious because
it is, of course, quite true that Nixon did indeed squander his political power.
But that, as the example of Harry Truman suggests, is by no means enough
to invite impeachment. I believe the proper reading of the lesson is that to
court impeachment a President must be guilty of substantial misdeeds, abuses
of power rising to constitutional dimension, and in addition must have alienated the other centers of power in and out of government to which a President, in our complex and interrelated system, must render account.'
This diagnosis, I am afraid, vastly complicates the search for a mechanism
in the political system that reliably triggers off impeachment proceedings
whenever a President meets only one of these conditions, namely lawbreaking.
I think a good bit of the thrashing around that constitutional scholars have
recently engaged in is directly traceable to their unwillingness to deal directly
with, yet their incapacity quite to ignore, the fact that impeachments are by
design and, in any event, inescapably, political acts as well as constitutional
events. Proposals for permanent special prosecutors, free-floating attorneys
general, congressional votes of no confidence, and so on, have to be examined
in the light of the politics that will inform their work.
This is not something I shall undertake here in the detail to which these,
and no doubt other, proposals are entitled. The dangers in each of these in
any event seem easy enough to give in broad outline. On the one hand, the
remedies proposed may be too weak, but may by their very existence shortcircuit the constitutional devices we already have and which, at least in the
Nixon case, appear to have worked.
Thus, the special prosecutor or attorney general may be irresolute or easily hoodwinked, or firmly under the influence of a miscreant President. The
vote of no confidence may prove less easy to mobilize than an impeachment
investigation, and the pendency of a no confidence motion may effectively
prevent the investigation from taking place.
Or, the remedies may prove too strong. The special prosecutor may be an
irresponsible careerist, or a semi-paranoid, or a plain old wild man. Such persons have on occasion occupied prosecutorial positions in the past. His--or
her-opportunities for mischief would be enormous, and it is difficult to see
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to whom such a prosecutor could be made sufficiently accountable to prevent
such misbehavior.
As to the "independent" Justice Department, history already provides a
partial analogue: For much of its existence, the FBI, by far the Justice
Department's most populous bureau, has to all intents and purposes been
politically unaccountable.6 I think somebody ought to ask the well-meaning
reformers-presumably civil libertarians-who want to move the entire Justice
Department in the direction of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover if this is really
what they want.
Finally, the spectre of a too-strong vote of no confidence. This, insofar as
it paralyzes the political direction of the executive branch, is a device for empowering bureaucrats, for encouraging their alliances with the interest groups
they serve, and, not incidentally, for pushing them much further than heretofore into alliances with the congressional committees that tend to their appropriations and their legal authorizations to act. Even the most innocent eye
can get a glimpse, I think, of what a promiscuously employed congressional
vote of no confidence would do to political incentives and political accountability in the national government. It would work a revolution. Have proponents of this measure been altogether candid about this?
Thus the mischief that Richard Nixon did continues to grow and proliferate in the absence of the kind of environmental impact statement that can sort
out political costs and consequences of various remedies. Yet few scholars are
satisfied that attending to the Nixon case alone fully disposes of the more
general problem, which is whether the President has grown too strong, and if
so, what to do about it.
II
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE SYSTEM

The sources of presidential power are by now reasonably well understood.
As Chief Executive he stands at the apex of a large number of bureaucratic
agencies, each of which is capable of going on about its business without his
intervention, each of which is bound to respond in some fashion when he
intervenes to change or sharpen the focus of their activity. He has a particular
constitutional duty to conduct the foreign affairs of the nation. And by virtue
of his powers of legislative veto, he can powerfully affect the course of the
legislative activity primarily confided to Congress.
Like well-invested money in trust, presidential power has been multiplying
these last few decades almost without regard to the initiatives of presidents.
This has come about because central government and its functions have
6. 1 suppose the most useful current discussion of the FBI is S.
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grown, thus inexorably widening the scope of potential presidential initiative,
because the world has become more densely interdependent, thus increasing
the urgency and the importance of foreign affairs in the overall scheme of
government, and because legislative initiatives and legislative business at the
center of government have increased, and hence the opportunities for presidential engagement in legislation have likewise grown.
We have, in addition, a firmly established literary tradition in this country
of President-worship, which more or less demands that in order to conserve
their good repute presidents must be seen conspicuously to grasp and manipulate these levers of power. Of course, levers are in fact only tenuously
and partially connected to the main forces in society so that all statements of
cause and effect originating in the White House are indifferently supported
by feedback from the society at large.7 In effect, then, the modern President
radiates an aura of enormous power, yet floats in a penumbra of uncertainty.
From outside looking in, the White House seems all purpose and energy.
From inside looking out, it may all seem to be done with mirrors and cosmetics. Since nothing substantial or long-lasting frequently follows from
presidential initiatives, large claims of efficacy are as easy to launch as small
ones.
What gives these claims their greatest credibility, aside from the enthusiasms of deep thinkers in the mass media, is the undoubted weakness of
countervailing agencies. Yet, here it pays to tread carefully. In recent years
the courts can hardly be said to have conscientiously maintained their status
as the least dangerous branch. Novel constitutional doctrines have emerged to
aid the court in such enterprises as the regulation of state abortion legislation
according to the development of the fetus. 8 Other doctrines, heretofore interposing limitations upon judicial initiative, such as the doctrine of standing,
have fallen into disuse. 9 The cherished constitutional principle of equal protection has become protean in its reach.
Two contributors to this symposium have noted well this trend and have
very intelligently explored ways of employing the Court to limit presidential
power."t

Constitutional conservatives are likely to regard such a program as

not unlike the expedient of loosing a second plague to stop an earlier infestation. Who kills the wasps once they do in the termites?
7. The classic formulation of this proposition is Mort Sahl's "Spring is here at last, just as
President Johnson promised." For a longer, not necessarily more cogent discussion, seePolsby,
Against Presidential Greatness, 63 COMMENTARY 61 (Jan. 1977).
8. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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A perspective less occupied with the manipulation of doctrines and justifications would, no doubt, confronting the same problem of overwhelming
presidential strength within the system, ask if something cannot be done to
strengthen the two countervailing political instrumentalities that exist in the
national arena: Congress and the national parties. There are purely philosophical advantages to this approach that cannot escape the eye even of the
most dedicated legalist: Political institutions have popular roots and, like the
President, can claim to be in touch with the needs and preferences of people
who, according to most renditions of democratic theory, ought to have an
important say in the disposition of things.
Yet the means of strengthening Congress and the parties in the political
system have mostly gone unexplored. Strengthening Congress at the Court's
command is a dubious proposition at best, since presumably what power Congress gains on the executive is willy-nilly lost to the judiciary. This is a serious
problem even absent the acceptance of doctrines such as Professors Van Alstyne and Gewirtz have so skilfully proposed. As a number of commentators
have perceived, Congress was the big loser in-of all cases-United States v.
Nixon, where the entitlement of Congress to investigate the executive pursuant to impeachment was overrun by the needs of a criminal trial and only
incidentally reinforced by the Court to the supine gratitude of Congress." If
Congress is unwilling independently to assert its right to impeach, ought not
scholars spend a word or two on how to restore to Congress the vertebrate
structure the Constitution so plainly gives to it?
As to the parties, commentary would likewise have been welcome, and
especially so because so much post-Watergate reform has focused upon the
party system and its peculiar central function, the presidential nominating
process. The thrust of legislation in this field has been not to strengthen, but
to further weaken parties. Public financing of the nomination process subsidizes partisan disintegration, and encourages successful presidential contenders to ignore parties, party leaders, state party organizations and so
on, as utterly superfluous to their selection. 2 Yet an argument could be
mounted to the effect that presidents constrained by and responsible to
parties are far less likely to misbehave than presidents who have no ties to
party. And in a serious contemporary discussion of separation of powers,
the silence or hostility of the founding fathers to party gives no warrant for
their exclusion.
There remain, however, some useful proposals for specific remedies to

11. See Gunther,]Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment
Process, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 30 (1974); Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United
States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 76 (1974).
12. A full ventilation of many of the issues involved can be found in ABA, SYMPOSIUM ON
CAMPAIGN FINANCING REGULATION (1975).
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recent ills, 13 some able explorations of the roots of specific presidential powers in legislation 14 and foreign affairs, 15 and three historical essays suggesting
that the real limits of presidential power as it has actually been exercised have
t6
been political, not constitutional.
Several commentators suggested that understanding how the President actually fits into the constitutional order is a scholarly priority of the first magnitude. Have we reached a situation where a presidency perpetually facing
"crisis" of various kinds disguises, under the facade of normality, an unconstitutional capacity to act? Is it realistic to contrast this situation with one in
which presidential inaction is preferred to insufficiently legitimized action?
"The central issue," as Professor James Sterling Young put it in an espe7
cially able commentary,'
is one of the compatibility of presidentialism with constitutionalism .... [T]he
fundamental rationale of . . .the constitutional system was that inaction is
better where the different branches of government cannot agree and don't ..
. . [T]he kinds of politics that follow from that constitutional logic are the
politics of consensus, coalition building .... Now a number of other countries
have a rather well articulated-even a constitutionally defined-system when
dealing with contingencies which cannot be handled under the rules of normal politics. . . .There are provisions under which a crisis triggers a suspension of the Constitution and democratic politics, elections, and so on. Typically, a junta takes over like in the case of France, the presidency assumes
abnormal powers for the duration of the contingencies. It seems to me that
our problem in American politics is we have embedded this contingency system in our normal constitutional structure and it is organized . . . around
the presidency. We conceal it in the practice of normal politics . . . and

[now] we are discovering that there are certain inherent [characteristics] of
presidentialism which are in rather direct conflict with constitutional logic ....
"There are [three] fundamental alternatives .... (1) Disable the contingency system, disable the Presidency because it is an alien presence in the
constitutional order and insist on handling all situations within the normal
political system. (2) Take the risk, accept the inevitable, the contingency system, and the power that aggregates to it and the Presidency, and wait until
the day that the contingency system is domesticated by colonization or annexation by the bureaucracy, or (3) try to regulate the contingency system, in the
spirit of the War Powers resolution, compromising both the constitutional system and the contingency system.

13. See Halperin & Hoffman, Secrecy and the Right to Know: National Security, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. no. 3 (1976); Lacovara, PresidentialPower to Gather Intelligence, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 3 (1976).
14. See Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2, at 87 (1976).
15. See Allison, Making War: The President and Congress, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 3 (1976);
Borosage, Para-Legal Authority and its Perils, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 3 (1976).
16. See Bernstein, supra note 2; Patterson, The Rise of PresidentialPower Before World War I1,40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2, at 39 (1976); Sofaer, The Presidency', War, and Foreign Affairs:
Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2, at 12 (1976).
17. J. Young, Introductory Comments to the Symposium on Presidential Power, 1st session,
January 23, 1976. (on file at Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, Duke University)
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Surely in theory the contrast is clear enough, but if Professor Sofaer is
correct, history is likely to give little comfort to those who urge the workability
of the strictly legitimist, the "constitutionalist" model. From the beginning,
evidently, our constitutional order has provided room for presidential aggrandizement, especially in situations of crisis.
This peculiar constitutional history by no means invalidates Professor
Young's concern. Indeed, as the franchise expands, as the education and articulateness of the American populace grows, as communications costs plummet, the problem of legitimacy is bound to recur in American politics, and if
anything, to increase in its urgency. From now on presidents will have to
grapple with this problem in ways that Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln,
and even Franklin Roosevelt did not. This is only one way in which the fates
have contrived to give the subject of the presidency and its powers a new
freshness for scholars and for all those who care about the health of the
American constitutional order.

